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THE PROBLEM WITH FRAND: HOW
THE LICENSING COMMITMENTS OF
STANDARD-SETTING ORGANIZATIONS
RESULT IN THE MISVALUING OF
PATENTS
INTRODUCTION
any modern patent systems have two aims that often
conflict: to promote the dissemination of knowledge and
to protect the rights of innovators.1 A patent grants an inventor
a limited period of time2 to exclude others from practicing his
invention.3 This temporary monopoly is meant to allow the in-
ventor to commercially profit from his invention, as a reward
for sharing it with the public.4 Thus, patent regimes attempt to
provide enough legal protection to incentivize an inventor to
share his invention, while not affording so much protection as
to stifle others from building upon current knowledge and fur-
ther advancing the field.5 Conversely, countries without patent
rights allow the public to exploit new technology immediately,
but may cause inventors to carefully guard their innovations.6
These countries also run the risk of deterring innovation be-
cause it is not profitable; new industries stagnate if the mone-
tary incentive to copy inventions is greater than the incentive
to invent.7 In the modern era of rapidly advancing technology,
some companies have found that it is more profitable to collab-
orate in the development of one new technical standard8 rather
1. See David Kline, Do Patents Truly Promote Innovation, IPWATCHDOG
(April 15, 2014), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2014/04/15/do-patents-truly-
promote-innovation/id=48768/.
2. A patent expires twenty years from the filing date of the patent appli-
cation in the United States.
3. CRAIG ALLENNARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 1 (3d ed. 2014).
4. Id. at 2–3.
5. Id.
6. Kline, supra note 1.
7. Id.
8. A technical standard can be defined as “any set of technical specifica-
tions that . . . provides . . . a common design for a product or process.” Mark
A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Rights and Standard-Setting Organizations,
90 CALIF. L. REV. 1889, 1896 (2002).
M
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than to individually develop competing technologies.9 When
this situation arises, a private standard-setting organization
(“SSO”) may emerge to oversee the development of the technol-
ogy.10 These collaborative bodies serve the purpose of pooling
resources and reducing both the time and money spent on the
development of alternative products.11 SSOs are generally pro-
competitive,12 but have anticompetitive implications by provid-
ing a forum for collusion.13
As a prerequisite to joining SSOs companies must contract
with one another, and sometimes with the SSO itself, to ensure
mutual fair treatment during the development and implemen-
tation of a new technical standard.14 The two most important
obligations that these companies commit to are disclosure and
licensing rules.15 Disclosure rules require that SSO members
“identify patents that [may be] essential to a proposed stand-
ard” in a timely manner.16 This requirement helps to keep SSO
members up to date on the state of technical development and
prevents “patent ambush”17 situations.18 Licensing rules ensure
9. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1067
(W.D. Wis. 2012) (“Through the standards-setting organizations, companies
agree on common technological standards so that all compliant products will
work together. Standards lower costs by increasing product manufacturing
volume and increase price competition by eliminating the costs for consumers
to switch between products manufactured by different firms.”).
10. See, e.g., infra Part I.A. on the formation of ETSI.
11. See id.
12. In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., Analysis of
Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 2398, 2399
(proposed Jan. 3, 2013) (“[T]hey encourage common technological platforms
that many different manufacturers ultimately incorporate into their respec-
tive products.”).
13. See Legal Issues Affecting Standard-Setting: Antitrust and Intellectual
Property, VENABLE LLP (April 2004), http://www.venable.com/legal-issues-
affecting-standard-setting-antitrust-and-intellectual-property-04-01-2004/.
14. See Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F.Supp.2d at 1067
(“[Disclosure and licensing] rules help to insure that standards do not allow
the owners of essential patents to abuse their market power to extort compet-
itors or prevent them from entering the marketplace.”).
15. Id.
16. Id.; see Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, in ETSI
RULES OF PROCEDURE 35 (2014), http://www.etsi.org/images/files/IPR/etsi-ipr-
policy.pdf.
17. One commentator describes patent ambush as follows:
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that SSO members license their respective intellectual proper-
ty rights (“IPR”) to each other on equitable terms.19 These rules
prevent patent hold-up situations, where a member abuses his
status as a standard-essential patent (“SEP”) holder by de-
manding excessive fees from potential licensees that have no
other alternative than to pay.20
The language that pervades SSO licensing requirements is
“fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory,” or “FRAND.”21 Alt-
hough these words seem intuitive and rational in theory,
FRAND is interpreted in a variety of ways.22 The requirement
is deliberately broad, in part to encourage contracting parties
to err on the side of caution during negotiations, but this
vagueness has a significant indirect effect on the business poli-
cies of both major and minor players in technological indus-
tries.23 Patents that are branded with a FRAND encumbrance
have inherently uncertain economic value, which can affect de-
cisions such as whether or not to apply for a patent in the first
The patent ambush . . . is said to occur where a patent owner partic-
ipates in the decision of a [SSO] to adopt a particular technology,
while failing to disclose its ownership of patents governing that
technology. Once the standard has been adopted and SSO members
and their constituents have adjusted their production to conform to
the standard . . . the patent owner asserts the patent and demands
licensing fees far higher than the patent owner could have achieved
had it sought to negotiate for a licensing fee prior to the adoption of
the standard.
Brian Dean Abramson, The Patent Ambush: Misuse or Caveat Emptor, 51
IDEA 71, 72 (2011).
18. See Disclosure Requirements for Patent Holders Who Participate in
Standard Setting Organizations, IP LAW BLOG (Dec. 14, 2005),
http://www.theiplawblog.com/2005/12/articles/patent-law/disclosure-
requirements-for-patent-holders-who-participate-in-standards-setting-
organizations/.
19. Richard J. Gilbert, Deal or No Deal? Licensing Negotiations In Stand-
ard-Setting Organizations, 77 ANTITRUST L. J. 855, 856 (2011)
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1042&context=richard_g
ilbert.
20. Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 1993 (2007).
21. Gilbert, supra note 19, at 856.
22. See id. at 860.
23. See discussion of the smartphone wars, infra Part I.E.
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place.24 This ambiguous requirement naturally results in litiga-
tion to determine whether the FRAND standard has been
met.25 Every contract negotiation is distinct, encompassing
many different considerations, and the few rulings that have
come down on FRAND matters are often too context-specific to
yield much precedent.26
A SEP is a patent that claims technology implemented into a
technical standard.27 Parties that hold SEPs are diverse, rang-
ing from individuals to corporate behemoths, and the licensing
rates they fetch for their patents are also varied.28 Smaller en-
tities may not have sufficient capital to engage in protracted
litigation with larger companies, and this imbalance of power
during license negotiations can result in lopsided contractual
terms.29 A weaker party is more likely to accept a low, possibly
un-FRAND royalty rate30 for SEPs it holds than to embark
down a costly litigious path that might avail it nothing.31
Equally unappealing is the prospect of a company that holds
relatively low-value SEPs extracting a high royalty rate, simply
24. An inventor or company may opt to keep the invention secret rather
than face this risk. See LYDIA PALLAS LOREN & JOSEPH SCOTT MILLER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW: CASES &MATERIALS 110 (4th ed. 2015) (“Where
an invention can be kept secret, an inventor can choose trade secret law’s mix
of benefits and risks, or opt for patent law’s different mix instead.”); David N.
Makous & Mina I. Hamilton, Compulsory IP Licensing and Standards-
Setting, Standard-Essential Patents and F/RAND, in INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LICENSING STRATEGIES 95 (2014).
25. See, e.g., Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 2d 1061
(W.D. Wis. 2012).
26. See, e.g., id.; see also Apple, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 869 F.Supp. 2d 901
(N.D. Ill. 2012).
27. See Apple, Inc., 886 F.Supp.2d at 1067.
28. See infra Part II.
29. See generally Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76
U. COLO. L. REV. 139 (2005).
30. A patent royalty rate is the amount that is paid from a commercial
producer to a patent holder for each unit the producer sells that employs the
technology. The rate is generally a certain percent of the retail value of the
unit. See, e.g., Eric Stasik, Royalty Rates and Licensing Strategies for Essen-
tial Patents on LTE (4G) Telecommunication Standards, LES NOUVELLES,
Sept., 2010, at 114, available at http://www.lesi.org/les-nouvelles/les-
nouvelles-online/2010/september-2010/2011/05/02/royalty-rates-and-
licensing-strategies-for-essential-patents-on-lte-%284g%29-
telecommunication-standards.
31. See Barnhizer, supra note 29.
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by having dominant negotiating power.32 In an ideal world, pa-
tents would be licensed at a rate that reflects their true value.33
Although “true value” is an innately debatable term that is
open to many interpretations, there are existing patent-
valuation methods that are appropriate for SEPs that could be
used to help level the playing field in the context of SSOs.34
This Note argues that the vague requirements of the patent-
licensing system overseen by SSOs lead to the consistent mis-
valuing of SEPs by interested parties, and that this system
could be improved by an objective assessment of a patent’s val-
ue prior to any contract negotiations. If the patents contrib-
uting to a standard could be given a basic appraisal by an unin-
terested third party, one that concentrates on the importance of
each patent to the standard at issue, then a large contract ne-
gotiation hurdle could be overcome before license negotiations
begin. Although there would still be disagreements between
negotiating parties, and the concept of FRAND would remain
very relevant and contentious, a large amount of uncertainty
would be discharged at a much lower cost than that of litiga-
tion and protracted negotiation. The overriding policy consid-
eration behind this proposal is that it is beneficial for negotiat-
ing parties to have a clear, impartial determination of the
technical value of their intellectual property, especially when
the licensing of it is compulsory.
Part I of this Note will discuss the relationship of SSOs and
the law, and why the current situation is untenable. Although
many SSOs impose requirements identical or comparable to
FRAND, this Note will focus on one SSO in particular, the Eu-
ropean Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI).35
ETSI is highly relevant today because it is responsible for over-
seeing the technologies that dominate the booming smartphone
industry,36 and because its ambiguous FRAND requirement is
32. See Stasik supra note 30.
33. Joseph G. Hadzima, Jr., How to Tell What Patents are Worth, FORBES
(June 25, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesleadershipforum/2013/06/25/how-to-tell-
what-patents-are-worth/.
34. See infra Part III.
35. See generally EURO. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST., http://www.etsi.org/
(last visited September 5, 2015).
36. Such technologies include 3G and LTE wireless telecommunication
networks. See discussion of the smartphone wars infra Part I.E.
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at the heart of the disputes plaguing the industry.37 This Part
will also illuminate the SEP issues that judicial bodies around
the world are grappling with to illustrate how a clearer
FRAND requirement can address many of the problems. Part
II will discuss the royalty rates that are currently being paid
for telecommunications SEPs, and the factors that influence
the rates. Although contract details, including royalty rates,
between companies are often confidential,38 there are some
trends to be gleaned from the data that is available.39 Some
courts have ordered specific royalty rates in FRAND litiga-
tion,40 and this Part will address the considerations that in-
formed the judgments. Part III will discuss the concept of pa-
tent valuation in general, and the different valuation methods
that parties employ. This discussion will include an analysis of
how these methods would bear on SEPs and the contract nego-
tiations surrounding them. Part IV of this Note will propose
methods to improve the current state of FRAND-based law by
implementing patent-valuation techniques early in the tech-
nical standard development process. This section will discuss
the different ways to implement this valuation, and analyze its
potential benefits and detriments.
I. BACKGROUND ON SSOS AND FRAND
Part I of this Note will provide the relevant context for tech-
nical standards and SSOs. It will discuss SSOs in general, but
will focus specifically on ETSI, and the obligations it requires of
its members. ETSI’s FRAND requirement in its Intellectual
Property Rights Policy (“IPR Policy”) provides minimal guid-
ance to its members, and many legal controversies have result-
ed.
A. Technical Standards and SEPs
SSOs are entities devoted to the development of new tech-
nical standards.41 Technical standards are technological cus-
37. See infra Part II.
38. Stasik, supra note 30, at 115.
39. Id.
40. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013). For an in-depth discussion of this
case, see infra Part II.
41. See In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., Analysis
of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 2399
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toms that emerge in industries, either naturally through mar-
ket dominance42 or through SSO promulgation.43 By joining
SSOs, major players in an industry agree to develop a technical
standard that would include technological contributions from
many members, rather than each developing its own stand-
alone technology.44 Standards provide a common base technol-
ogy that manufacturers can build upon in their own distinct
ways.45 Additionally, standards lower costs for consumers by
reducing the research and design costs that companies incur.46
They also encourage the compatibility of complementary prod-
ucts and product components, and the interoperability of com-
peting products.47 For instance, ETSI oversees the development
of wireless standards such as 3G48 and LTE49 mobile communi-
cation technologies.50 ETSI was formed in 1988, “both to accel-
erate the standardization process and to promote a greater de-
gree of harmonization among the various European telecom-
munications systems.”51 It is managed by the General Assem-
(“American consumers rely on standardized technology for the interoperabil-
ity of consumer electronics and other product. Manufacturers of these prod-
ucts participate in standard-setting organizations . . . that agree upon and
develop standards based on shared technologies that incorporate patents.”).
42. This is considered a “de facto” standard. Karen Bartleson, What’s the
Difference Between De Jure and De Facto Standards? (Nov. 13, 2012),
ELECTRONIC DESIGN, http://electronicdesign.com/embedded/what-s-difference-
between-de-jure-and-de-facto-standards.
43. This is considered a “de jure” standard. Id.
44. See In the Matter of Motorola Mobility LLC and Google Inc., Analysis
of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. 2398, 2399
(proposed Jan. 3, 2013).
45. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1892–1893.
46. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F.Supp.2d 1061, 1067 (W.D.
Wis. 2012).
47. Makous & Hamilton, supra note 24, at 9; In the Matter of Motorola
Mobility LLC and Google Inc., Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid
Public Comment, 78 Fed. Reg. at 2399.
48. For a basic description of 3G technology, see Vangie Beal, 3G,
WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/3/3G.html (last visited Jan.
24, 2015).
49. For a basic description of 4G LTE technology, see Vangie Beal, 4G
LTE, WEBOPEDIA, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/4/4G_LTE.html (last
visited Jan. 24, 2015).
50. Apple, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 2d at 1068.
51. Stanley M. Besen, The European Telecommunications Standards Insti-
tute, 14 TELECOMM. POL’Y 521 (1990)
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bly, the ETSI Board, and the Secretariat.52 Substantive work is
performed by a range of different committees,53 and member-
ship in ETSI is open to “administrations, public network opera-
tors, manufacturers, users, private service providers54 and re-
search bodies.”55 All of the big names in the telecommunica-
tions industry, including Apple, Google, and Samsung, are
members of ETSI, and incorporate ETSI technical standards
into their smartphones and tablets.56 Some other SSOs include
the International Organization for Standardization (ISO)57 and
52. How We Organize Our Work, EURO. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST.,
http://www.etsi.org/about/how-we-work/how-we-organize-our-work (last visit-
ed Oct. 18, 2015). ETSI describes the General Assembly as “the highest deci-
sion-making body in ETSI,” whose responsibilities include “[d]etermining our
overall policy and strategy[,] . . . [d]ealing with membership issues[,] . . . ap-
pointing the members of the ETSI Board[,] . . . the Director-General[, and] . . .
the Finance Committee members[, and] [a]pproving changes to our Statutes
and Rules of Procedure.” The General Assembly, EURO. TELECOMM.
STANDARDS INST., http://www.etsi.org/about/how-we-work/how-we-organize-
our-work/general-assembly (last visited Oct. 18, 2015). The ETSI Board is
“the executive arm of the General Assembly,” and performs tasks such as
overseeing the technical committees and advising the General Assembly on
finance issues. The ETSI Board, EURO. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST.,
http://www.etsi.org/about/how-we-work/how-we-organize-our-work/board (last
visited Oct. 18, 2015). The Secretariat “comprises about 120 members of staff
who provide technical, administrative and logistical support” for ETSI, in-
cluding processing and publishing standards, legal services, and financial
services. The Secretariat, EURO. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST.,
http://www.etsi.org/about/how-we-work/how-we-organize-our-
work/secretariat (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
53. Technical committees “address[] a number of standardization activities
in a specific technology area,” which includes drafting standards and specifi-
cations. Industry Specification Groups focus on very specific activities when
the need arises. Special Committees are similar to Technical Committees, but
focus on coordination. Specialist Task Forces are “groups of technical experts
who come together for a defined period (typically a few months) to work in-
tensively on specific items.” How We Organize OurWork, supra note 52.
54. These entities perform the following functions: “[m]anufacturers devel-
op and/or manufacture equipment that is to be connected to a public network,
users are entities that use a public network, and private service providers
make use of a public network to provide service to third parties.” Besen, su-
pra note 51 at 522 n.8.
55. Id. at 522.
56. See ETSI Current Members, EURO. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST.,
http://www.etsi.org/membership/current-members (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
57. See About ISO, INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION,
http://www.iso.org/iso/home/about.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
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the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards
Association (IEEE-SA),58 which produce standards in indus-
tries including power and energy, information technology, and
communications.59
Many standards use patented technology, and “if a patent
claims60 technology selected by [an] SSO, the patent is called
an ‘essential patent’” or SEP.61 Ownership of a SEP conveys
some burdens as well as benefits. In comparison with a normal
patent, a SEP owner “has a powerful position, and could
achieve monopoly or exclusionary power in the market for the
technology.”62 For example, every company that manufactures
phones or tablets incorporating standards such as WiFi,63 3G,
and LTE uses technology reading on all of the patents that are
essential to those standards. Smartphones incorporate approx-
imately 250,000 patents total,64 and unless the company has a
license to each, it is infringing at least one. A SEP owner could
theoretically leverage this position by demanding a high royal-
ty rate from smartphone manufacturers, based on the notion
that it makes better business sense for the manufacturer to pay
than to potentially face a court-ordered injunction to cease pro-
58. See About the IEEE Standards Association, IEEE STANDARDS ASS’N,
http://standards.ieee.org/about/ieeesa.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
59. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Mobility, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 2d 1061, 1069 (W.D.
Wis. 2012); see also Technology Standards & Resources,
http://standards.ieee.org/findstds/index.html (last visited Sep. 18, 2015).
60. A patent claim is
the part of the patent application where the inventor specifically
states what their invention is and what it can do. Claims define the
legal scope of a patent and define what can be protected by patent
law. You could say that claims define the invention, what it is and
what it does.
Mary Bellis, Definition – Claim, ABOUT MONEY,
http://inventors.about.com/od/definations/g/claim.htm (last visited Jan. 24,
2015).
61. Apple, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 2d at 1067.
62. Makous & Hamilton, supra note 24, at 9.
63. See Vangie Beal, Wi-Fi, WEBOPEDIA,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/W/Wi_Fi.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
64. Mike Masnick, There Are 250,000 Active Patents That Impact
Smartphones; Representing One In Six Active Patents Today, TECHDIRT (Oct.
18, 2012, 8:28 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/innovation/articles/20121017/10480520734/the
re-are-250000-active-patents-that-impact-smartphones-representing-one-six-
active-patents-today.shtml.
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duction entirely.65 However, this powerful position is limited by
the licensing requirements that ETSI imposes.
B. Requirements of SSOs
Most SSOs require their members to enter into covenants
with the SSO or with each other that govern the development
of the standards they promulgate.66 The disclosure rules re-
quire SSO members to divulge IPR they own that are relevant
to a standard, including patents and patent applications, at the
earliest feasible time during development of that standard.67
ETSI, in its IPR Policy, requires that “each member shall use
its reasonable [endeavors] . . . to inform ETSI of essential IPRs
in a timely fashion.”68 The primary intent of these rules is to
avoid patent ambush situations and to keep SSO members
abreast of the current state of the developing technology.69 The
licensing rules generally “restrict the terms that holders of
SEPs can demand” from a licensee, requiring licenses on fair,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms (FRAND or
“RAND”).70 ETSI requires that its members sign a contract
stating that it will grant irrevocable licenses on these terms.71
These commitments are not licenses in themselves, but a con-
tract with the SSO mandating the member enter into a
FRAND license with a potential licensee if and when the oppor-
tunity arises.72 Additionally, ETSI requires that if one of its
members transfers essential IPR to another party, the member
“shall include appropriate provisions in the relevant transfer
documents to ensure that the undertaking is binding on the
65. See Lemley & Shapiro, supra note 20 (discussing patent hold-up).
66. Apple, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 2d at 1067.
67. See Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 16,
at 35.
68. Id.
69. See Apple, Inc., 886 F.Supp. 2d at 1067 (“Such rules help to insure that
standards do not allow the owners of essential patents to abuse their market
power to extort competitors or prevent them from entering the market-
place.”).
70. Makous & Hamilton, supra note 24, at 10. American courts have gen-
erally dropped the “fair” portion since it does not really add anything that is
not covered by “reasonable” and “nondiscriminatory,” but the terms “FRAND”
and “RAND” are used interchangeably. Id. at 7 n.44.
71. Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 16, at 36.
72. Makous & Hamilton, supra note 24, at 10.
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transferee.”73 This provision allows licensees to feel safe know-
ing that the licensor cannot sell his IPR to a third party that
could subsequently revoke the license and demand higher roy-
alties.
C. FRAND Licensing
Defining “FRAND” is a contentious issue. The SSOs that em-
ploy the term leave it vague and give little-to-no guidance
about what licensing terms actually qualify as FRAND.74 The
words that make up the acronym are designedly broad because
they must work across a variety of industries, and be interpret-
ed by different jurisdictions around the world.75 Defining the
term precisely would be prohibitively complex or “may be im-
possible, given the variety of licenses and industries” it applies
to.76 This is why “virtually no SSO specifies the terms on which
licenses must be granted beyond [these] vague require-
ment[s],”77 and why some SSOs, like IEEE-SA, “expressly for-
bid discussion of such issues when a standard is under consid-
eration, presumably for fear of antitrust liability.”78 The term
“reasonable” refers primarily to royalty rates,79 and courts that
have attempted to set the rate themselves have shown that the
analysis is wholly dependent on the facts of the dispute and the
context of the SSO.80 “Nondiscriminatory” does not imply that
royalty rates must be identical for all licensees of a SEP, but
that “condition[s] included in a licensing agreement must be
the same regardless of the licensee.”81 For example, a royalty
rate that is FRAND for one licensee may be so expensive for
another licensee that it prohibits her from feasibly manufactur-
ing her product.82 The nondiscriminatory requirement is in-
tended to “maintain a level playing field with respect to com-
73. Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 16, at 36.
74. Id.
75. See Mikko Valimaki, A Flexible Approach to RAND Licensing 3 (Mar.
31, 2008), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261642.
76. Id.; Makous & Hamilton, supra note 24, at 10.
77. Lemley, supra note 8, at 1964.
78. Id. at 1965.
79. Makous & Hamilton, supra note 24, at 10.
80. Id; see infra Part II.A.
81. Makous & Hamilton, supra note 24, at 11–12
82. Id. at 12.
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petitors,” so it might be considered discriminatory for a licensor
to demand such a rate.83
Prior to the smartphone wars,84 FRAND was not as contro-
versial and there was no need for a clearer definition.85 Be-
cause of the close relationship that companies in the same in-
dustry have, there exists a mutual deterrent against aggressive
licensing strategies; it may be more beneficial to err on the side
of caution in the short term than to lose out in the long term by
damaging a business relationship.86 But since the rise of non-
practicing entities (“NPE”s), more pejoratively referred to as
“patent trolls,” FRAND issues have increased.87 Big name pa-
tent holders, such as Apple or Google, can sell patents to NPEs
who, rather than produce something using the patented tech-
nology, hold onto them solely to extract licensing fees and dam-
ages from potential infringers.88 This practice, referred to as
“patent privateering,” changed the passive playing field be-
cause an NPE has little incentive to maintain a professional
relationship with a company that has nothing to offer it except
money.89
NPEs are free to “abuse the market power conferred after a
standard has been adopted[,] without fear of future retalia-
tion.”90 Additionally, the smartphone industry has been partic-
ularly contentious ever since “Apple started a thermonuclear
patent war”91 to eliminate Google’s Android operating system
from the marketplace.92 The field is immensely profitable, and
“Apple had so much to lose from the inevitable commoditization
83. Id. at 11–12.
84. See discussion of smartphone wars infra Part I.E.
85. Dan O’Connor, Standard-Essential Patents in Context: Just a Small
Piece of the Smartphone War Puzzle, PATENT PROGRESS, Mar. 5, 2013, at 5,
available at http://www.patentprogress.org/2013/03/05/standard-essential-
patents-in-context-just-a-small-piece-of-the-smartphone-war-puzzle/.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Scott M. Daniels, Privateering: Patent Holding Companies Unleash
Patent Portfolios, IPWATCHDOG (Feb. 11, 2013),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/11/privateering-patent-holding-
companies-unleash-patent-portfolios/id=35287/.
89. Id.
90. O’Connor, supra note 85, at 6.
91. Id.; see infra Part I.E.
92. Maurits Dolmans & Daniel Ilan, European Antitrust and Patent Acqui-
sitions: Trolls in the Patent Thickets 8 COMPETITION L. INT’L, Aug. 2012, at 7,
8.
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of the smartphone and tablet space that the heavy cost of wag-
ing war seemed to be worth the price.”93 This ongoing patent
cold war is fought in the courtroom, and concerns issues such
as low-quality patents, design patents, the interpretation of
FRAND, and the availability of injunctions on SEPs.94
D. Problem with ETSI’s IPR Policy
As of now, ETSI gives no guidance as to what constitutes a
FRAND licensing rate, other than the words that make up the
acronym.95 In fact, ETSI does not even ensure that the patents
that are declared as “essential” to a standard are actually es-
sential.96 In essence, ETSI is simply a repository for declara-
tions made by companies about patents that may not only be
nonessential, but may even be invalid.97 The Foreword of a
Special Report issued by ETSI states that “ETSI has not
checked the validity of [the IPR declarations] . . . and cannot
confirm, or deny, that the patents/patent applications are, in
fact, essential, or potentially essential.”98 By “potentially essen-
tial,” ETSI is referring to patent applications that have not
even been granted as patents yet. A study published in an
IEEE scientific journal estimates that only 21 percent of the
patents declared essential to the 3GPP standard are actually
essential.99 An evaluation of SEPs for the LTE standard “esti-
93. O’Connor, supra note 85, at 7.
94. Id. at 8.
95. See, e.g., Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note
16, at 36.
96. EURO. TELECOMM. STANDARDS INST., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
(IPRS); ESSENTIAL, OR POTENTIALLY ESSENTIAL, IPRS NOTIFIED TO ETSI IN
RESPECT OF ETSI STANDARDS 4 (1999), available at
http://webstore.ansi.org/RecordDetail.aspx?sku=ETSI+SR+000+314-v1.4.1-
1999-11.
97. See id. (“The information that appears on the ETSI IPR database re-
flects the ETSI Members’ declarations with regards to IPRs that they have
considered essential for a particular ETSI standard.”).
98. Id.
99. David Goodman, 3G Cellular Standards and Patents, IEEE WIRELESS
COMM. 2005, June 13, 2005, Part VI.,
http://eeweb.poly.edu/dgoodman/wirelesscom2005.pdf. The definition of “es-
sential” used for the purposes of the study is that of the ETSI IPR Policy,
which the author describes as narrow:
“ESSENTIAL” as applied to IPR means that it is not possible on
technical (but not commercial) grounds, taking into account normal
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mated that 55 of them are ‘essential’ patents conforming to
ETSI standards.”100
Additionally, each patent is unique. They “differ in their like-
ly validity, their importance to the standard, and the ease with
which they can be designed around.”101 Treating all SEPs as
equal “may have the perverse result of encouraging [SSO]
members to list as many patents as possible that are conceiva-
bly relevant to a standard, hoping to increase their royalty rate
through sheer quantity without any reference to quality.”102
Declaring a patent as essential becomes more of a business de-
cision than anything; if a company considers a patent more
valuable if it is declared essential, then it will probably do so,
even if its essentiality is questionable. A company should not
be allowed to gain market power, and thus enhance royalty
rates, through such an imprecise measurement as “declarations
to ETSI.”
E. Litigation Surrounding FRAND: The Smartphone Wars
The ambiguity of FRAND has caused problems that have
propagated beyond the licensing terms that it is focused on,
primarily because of its important role in the smartphone wars.
In brief, when Android103 began to infiltrate the smartphone
market, Apple and Microsoft sought to resist Google’s intru-
sion.104 Both of their strategies hinged around their extensive
patent portfolios, but they approached the problem differently:
Apple sought injunctions against some smartphone manufac-
turers that utilized Android, while Microsoft charged these
manufacturers substantial royalties to drive up the cost of An-
droid smartphones.105 Google sought to bolster its defenses by
technical practice and the state of the art generally available at the
time of standardization, to make, sell, lease, otherwise dispose of,
repair, use of operate EQUIPMENT or METHODS which comply
with a STANDARD without infringing that IPR.
Annex 6: ETSI Intellectual Property Rights Policy, supra note 16, at 41.
100. CYBER CREATIVE INSTITUTE CO. LTD., EVALUATION OF LTE ESSENTIAL
PATENTS DECLARED TO ETSI 25 (2011),
http://www.cybersoken.com/research/pdf/lte01EN.pdf.
101. See Lemley supra note 8, at 1965.
102. Id.
103. Android is Google’s operating system.
104. Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 92, at 8.
105. Id.
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buying patents on the market,106 and a patent race ensued.107
Apple and Microsoft’s efforts culminated in a joint effort with
other tech companies to buy six thousand patents from Nor-
tel,108 “outbidding Google’s initial ‘stalking horse’ bid of $900
million and picking up the portfolio for a tidy $4.5 billion,” after
which Google bought Motorola, including all of Motorola’s pa-
tents, in response.109 The smartphone conflicts are not limited
to these companies, but extend to dozens more.110 For example,
a five-year long infringement dispute between Apple and Sam-
sung recently settled for $548 million, but remains open pend-
ing an appeal of an earlier partial judgment.111
The issues stemming from this dispute are global, and have
been addressed by many different judicial bodies. Germany has
been an attractive venue because of its relatively quick pro-
ceedings, and its Orange Book decision112 has proved influential
in the smartphone wars, despite concerning a different tech-
nology.113 In the decision, the German Supreme Court provided
guidance for when a “FRAND defense” could be raised success-
fully.114 The defense is premised on the unavailability of injunc-
tions for SEP infringement: ownership of a SEP can be charac-
terized as a legal monopoly over the standardized technology,
in the sense that a party deploying the technology must be
106. When the parties to a patent dispute have comparably-sized patent
portfolios that read on similar technologies, the incentive to cross-license
usually exceeds the incentive to litigate. Id.
107. Id.
108. Nortel is a technology company that went bankrupt. Welcome, NORTEL
NETWORKS INC., http://www.nortel-us.com/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
109. Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 92, at 8.
110. Mike Masnick, Meet the Patent Thicket: Who’s Suing Who for
Smartphone Patents, TECHDIRT (Oct. 8, 2010, 9:34 AM),
https://www.techdirt.com/blog/wireless/articles/20101007/22591311328/meet-
the-patent-thicket-who-s-suing-who-for-smartphone-patents.shtml.
111. Ben Lovejoy, Five Years After Patent Trial, Samsung & Apple Reach
$548M Settlement – But It’s Not Over Yet, 9TO5MAC.COM (Dec. 4, 2015),
http://9to5mac.com/2015/12/04/apple-samsung-patent-trial-settlement/.
112. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] May 6, 2009, 180
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESGERICHTSHOFES IN ZIVILSACHEN [BGHZ] 312
(Ger.).
113. Bernd Allekotte, FRAND-Based Litigation and Competition Issues in
Europe, IAM, Aug. 29, 2013, at 53, 54, available at http://www.iam-
magazine.com/Intelligence/IP-Monetisation-Yearbook/2013/Articles/FRAND-
based-litigation-and-competition-issues-in-Europe.
114. Id. at 54.
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granted rights to all of the SEPs to legally use the technology,
so seeking an injunction for infringement of a SEP could be
considered abuse of a dominant market position.115 The court
ruled that this defense can only be used by an alleged infringer
if he had “offered a reasonable license agreement to the patent-
ee; and fulfilled all obligations resulting from a license agree-
ment (even in cases where the offer was rejected).”116 This high
standard for resisting an injunction is a compelling reason for
patentees to sue potential infringers in German courts.117
The European Commission (EC) also assumed a more central
position in the smartphone wars after various complaints were
filed with it subsequent to the merger of Google and
Motorola.118 In one such complaint, Apple and Microsoft alleged
antitrust violations by Motorola, who had sought injunctions
and significant royalties against Apple and Microsoft based on
SEPs.119 The EC responded in part by saying that an injunction
could be legitimate if the potential licensee is unwilling to ne-
gotiate FRAND terms in good faith, based on elements of the
Orange Book ruling.120 The concept of “unwilling licensees” re-
mains significant in jurisdictions worldwide, and the proper
application of the term hinges partly on whether a potential
licensee’s opening offer can be characterized as FRAND.121
These verdicts show how a poorly defined FRAND can contrib-
ute to disputes concerning billions of dollars.
II. ROYALTY RATES FOR SEPS
In general, judicial and administrative bodies have elected
not to calculate and order royalty rates for FRAND-
encumbered patents, opting to let disputing parties resolve it
between themselves.122 This sort of determination does not of-
115. See Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 92, at 9.
116. Allekotte, supra note 113, at 54.
117. Id. at 55.
118. See Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 92, at 8–9.
119. Id. at 8.
120. Id. at 4.
121. See, e.g., Florian Mueller, Google Tells Appeals Court Apple is ‘Unwill-
ing Licensee’, Seeks Injunction Over FRAND Patents, FOSS PATENTS (Mar. 15,
2013), http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/03/google-tells-appeals-court-apple-
is.html.
122. See Jonathan Radcliffe & Gillian Sproul, FRAND and the Smartphone
Wars, INTELL. PROP., Dec. 2011–Jan. 2012, at 45, 46, available at
http://www.mayerbrown.com/Files/Publication/477a076f-dd7e-408c-8321-
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ten fall within the competence of courts that do not specialize
in patent disputes, and for a court to calculate the rate itself is
a long and expensive process.123 Additionally, FRAND disputes
were not all that common until the smartphone wars, so there
is little precedent to guide a court for this kind of analysis.124
Only recently have some U.S. courts and one Chinese court
specifically ordered a royalty rate that it considered FRAND,
and the detailed opinions from the U.S. courts help illuminate
the relevant factors going into these rates.125
The royalties that parties agree to without legal intervention
are, like most contractual details, largely confidential, but
studies have been performed to estimate the rates. By compar-
ing the royalty rates articulated by judicial bodies and those
that were negotiated, the disparity between the intent of
FRAND and FRAND in practice is illuminated, and a strong
case is made for the importance of an objective patent valua-
tion.
A. Court-Ordered Royalty Rates
When necessary, U.S. courts calculate appropriate royalty
rates for normal patent licenses by using a multifactor test126
that was first expressed by the Southern District of New York
in Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp127 and approved
soon after by the Federal Circuit.128 Among the fifteen factors
are considerations “including the relationship of the licensing
parties; the type of license they likely would agree upon; com-
parable licenses made by the licensee . . . ; the nature, benefits,
extent of use, and alternative to the patented technology; and
64edf33c190e/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/5b202a76-bc80-4467-
b286-7a3b8e90e06d/Frand_Smartphone_Sproul.pdf.
123. See Karl P. Kilb, Arbitration of Patent Disputes: An Important Option
in the Age of Information Technology, 4 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA&ENT.
L.J. 599, 609 (1993); see also, e.g., infra note 137.
124. See O’Connor, supra note 85, at 5.
125. See discussion infra Part I.A.
126. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1966 n.331.
127. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.Supp. 1116, 1120
(S.D.N.Y. 1970).
128. Christopher B. Seaman, Reconsidering the Georgia-Pacific Standard
for Reasonable Royalty Patent Damages, 2010 B.Y.U. L. REV. 1661, 1681
(2010).
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the value of features unrelated to the patent.”129 The Southern
District declined to rate the importance of each factor, stating
that it “attempted to exercise a discriminating judgment re-
flecting its ultimate appraisal of all pertinent factors in the
context of the credible evidence.”130
Prior to April 25, 2013, “no judge had ever attempted to cal-
culate what would constitute a licensing rate that is [FRAND]
until U.S. District Judge James Robart of the Western District
of Washington,”131 in a case between Microsoft and Motorola
Mobility132 involving the H.264 video codec standard133 and the
IEEE-SA 802.11 WiFi134 standard.135 In his lengthy opinion,
Judge Robart seeks “to strike the FRAND balance (compensat-
ing fairly, but not overcompensating, SEP holders) within the
Georgia-Pacific framework.”136 He stressed that a highly rele-
vant consideration is the relative importance of the SEP to the
129. Id. at 1683. The relevant factors articulated in Georgia-Pacific, in brief,
are 1) royalties received from other licensees for the same patent, 2) royalties
paid by licensees for comparable patents, 3) the nature and scope of the li-
cense, 4) the licensor’s policy regarding its patent monopoly, 5) the commer-
cial relationship between the parties, 6) the effect the patent has on other
products or sales of either party, 7) the duration of the patent and the term of
the license, 8) the established profitability of products made under the pa-
tent, 9) the utility and advantages of the patent product over old methods or
products, 10) the nature of the patented invention, 11) the extent to which
the infringer has made use of the invention, 12) the custom in the business or
comparable businesses, 13) the portion of the profit that should be credited to
the invention, 14) the opinion of experts, and 15) the amount that would have
been agreed upon in a good faith negotiation. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 318
F.Supp at 1120.
130. Id. at 1121.
131. Ryan Davis, Landmark Motorola FRAND Ruling May Serve as
Roadmap, LAW360 (Apr. 26, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/436295/landmark-motorola-frand-ruling-
may-serve-as-roadmap.
132. Google is Motorola Mobility’s parent company. Florian Mueller, A
Closer Look at the 207-Page, Landmark FRAND Rate-Setting Decision in Mi-
crosoft v. Motorola, FOSS PATENTS (Apr. 28, 2013),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/04/a-closer-look-at-207-page-
landmark.html.
133. What is H.264, H264 INFO, http://www.h264info.com/?page_id=10 (last
visited Jan. 24, 2015).
134. Vangie Beal, 802.11 IEEE Wireless LAN Standards, WEBOPEDIA,
http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/8/802_11.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
135. Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL 2111217
(W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
136. Mueller, supra note 132.
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standard,137 which can be assessed using information such as
“the total number of essential patents [declared to the stand-
ard]; the patent holder’s level of involvement in the standards
setting process . . . ; the quantifiable value of the essential pa-
tent’s contribution to the standard . . . ; and the existence or
non-existence of alternative technologies . . . that could have
been integrated into the standard.” 138 Despite the fact that his
opinion is only binding on the Western District of Washington,
it is anticipated to be influential in other jurisdictions and
abroad.139
Judge Holderman of the Northern District of Illinois followed
Judge Robart’s approach in a memorandum opinion assessing a
reasonable royalty rate for patents essential to WiFi in a dis-
pute between Innovatio IP Ventures (a patent assertion entity)
and “numerous . . . commercial users of wireless internet tech-
nology located throughout the United States,” including coffee
shops, hotels, and restaurants.140 The importance of the patent
in relation to the standard as a whole was again a vital consid-
eration, and the royalty rate was assessed in comparison to
that found inMicrosoft v. Motorola141:
Judge Robart concluded that Motorola’s patents were only of
minimal value to the standard, [ . . . ] whereas the court here
has found that Innovatio’s patents are of moderate to moder-
ate-high importance to the standard. A multiplier of about
three is a reasonable difference between the two royalties to
account for the greater importance of Innovatio’s patents to
the 802.11 standard.142
137. Stan Lewis, Valuing FRAND-Obligated Patents: An Emerging Consen-
sus, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 5, 2013),
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=1a8dc5a6-7b2c-4d23-901b-
0cf9d6af0065.
138. Id.
139. See Mueller, supra note 132. The considerations he expressed are very
relevant to the basic valuation method that will be discussed infra Part III.
140. In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, No. 11 C 9308,
2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill 2013).
141. Florian Mueller, Federal Judge Determines 19 WiFi Patents are Worth
a FRAND Rate of Less than 10 Cents per Unit, FOSS PATENTS (Oct. 3, 2013),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2013/10/federal-judge-determines-19-wifi.html.
142. In re Innovatio, 2013 WL 5593609, at *44; see also Mueller, supra note
141.
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Prior to either of these cases, Judge Richard Posner, in a
dismissal of a dispute between Apple and Motorola,143 provided
some FRAND guidance different from, but not at odds with,
Judge Robart’s framework.144 He wrote that:
The proper method of computing a FRAND royalty starts
with what the cost to the licensee would have been of obtain-
ing, just before the patented invention was declared essential
to compliance with the industry standard, a license for the
function performed by the patent. That cost would be a meas-
ure of the value of the patent [in its capacity of being a] pa-
tent.145
A potential licensee of a SEP has no alternative to obtaining a
license for the patent once it is adopted by a standard. Howev-
er, Posner’s approach would completely disregard this unique
hold-up value of a SEP and “confine the patentee’s royalty de-
mand to the value conferred by the patent itself” rather than
considering this additional value.146 Many SEPs would have a
commercial value of close to zero if they weren’t included in a
standard, because of the prevalence of suitable workarounds.147
Allowing patent holders to “unduly enrich themselves because
they were part of a standard-setting cartel” would make inno-
vations incorporating the standard more expensive, at odds
with one of the main objectives of FRAND and standard-
setting, which is to foster innovation.148
Foreign courts have not been as forthcoming as U.S. courts
when it comes to establishing royalty rates for FRAND-
encumbered patents.149 One notable exception is China, where
the Guangdong People’s Court affirmed a lower court’s FRAND
143. Apple, Inc. v. Motorola Inc., 869 F.Supp. 2d 901 (N.D. Ill. 2012).
144. Florian Mueller, Judge Posner’s Dismissal of Two-Way Apple-Motorola
Lawsuit has Many Important Implications, FOSS PATENTS (June 23, 2012),
http://www.fosspatents.com/2012/06/judge-posners-dismissal-of-two-
way.html.
145. Apple, Inc., 869 F.Supp 2d at 913.
146. Id.
147. Mueller, supra note 144.
148. See id.
149. See generally Koren W. Wong-Ervin, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Standard-
Essential Patents: The International Landscape, INTELL. PROP. COMMITTEE
SECTION ON ANTITRUST L., Spring 2014, at 4,
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/attachments/key-speeches-
presentations/standard-essential_patents_the_intl_landscape.pdf.
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royalty determination in Huawei v. InterDigital,150 but failed to
disclose the calculation that went into the figure.151 The dispute
concerned telecommunications SEPs152 that Huawei, the lead-
ing smartphone manufacturer in China, alleged that InterDigi-
tal refused to license on FRAND terms.153 The lower court
ruled that the royalty rate for the SEPs “should not exceed .019
percent of the actual sales price” of the infringing products.154
It is possible that this low rate was influenced by the desire to
penalize InterDigital for its un-FRAND tactics towards
Huawei, including royalty demands that can be characterized
as discriminatory, when compared to the deals that InterDigi-
tal struck with other smartphone manufacturers concerning
the same SEPs.155 The EC generally has a hands-off approach
to this issue, but has expressed that a neutral third-party, such
as a court or an arbitrator, can set FRAND rates.156 It has also
indicated that a “‘reasonable royalty’ must be – or approximate
to – the price that would hypothetically be reached in an arms-
length negotiation.”157 This notion is consistent with the Amer-
ican approach in Georgia-Pacific and its progeny.158
B. Negotiated Royalty Rates
Assertions regarding the value of a SEP are widely varied.
Some have contended that one SEP can have the same value as
an entire portfolio of SEPs, while others have contended that
each individual SEP contributes the same amount of value to
150. Michael Han & Kexin Li, Huawei v. InterDigital: China at the Cross-
roads of Antitrust and Intellectual Property, Competition and Innovation,
COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Nov. 28, 2013, at 6.
151. Shylah R. Alfonso & Kevin A. Zeck, Chinese Court Issues Landmark
Decision Determining a FRAND Royalty Rate, INTELL. PROP. COMMITTEE
SECTION ON ANTITRUST L., Apr. 1–5, 2013, at 1,
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/antitrust_law/at31
5000_tidbits_20130405.authcheckdam.pdf.
152. The SEPs at issue relate to 2G, 3G, and 4G technologies.
153. Alfonso & Zeck, supra note 151.
154. Han & Li, supra note 150, at 6.
155. See id.
156. Wong-Ervin, supra note 149, at 8–9.
157. Radcliffe & Sproul, supra note 122.
158. See, e.g., Microsoft Corp. v. Motorola, Inc., No. C10-1823JLR, 2013 WL
2111217 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 25, 2013).
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the standard.159 Licensing terms between companies are usual-
ly confidential, but studies have revealed a wide range of royal-
ty rates for smartphone technology.160 At one end, cumulative
royalty rates paid by a smartphone manufacturer for patents
reading on the 3G capability (the standard is also known as
UMTS or WCDMA) have been estimated “as high as 30 percent
of the total price of each phone.”161 On the other end, Nokia,
who holds many SEPs reading on the UMTS standard, stated
that it “paid less than 3 percent aggregate license fees on
WCDMA handset sales under all its patent license agree-
ments.”162 This stark disparity implies that companies with pa-
tents to “trade” in a cross-licensing scenario, such as Nokia, are
fetching exceedingly favorable rates.163 For the 2G (GSM)
standard, some have alleged that the cumulative royalties paid
by cell phone manufacturers with no patents to cross-license
was as high as 35 to 40 percent of the phone’s selling price,
with more conservative estimates putting the rate at 10 to 13
percent.164 It suffices to say that there is little transparency
and no strong consensus regarding the value of SEPs for these
standards.
In addition to these estimates, a limited study was conducted
during the rollout of the 4G (LTE) standard to analyze the roy-
alty rates that companies announced for their portfolios when
compared to the number of SEPs held by the companies.165 The
results expectedly showed that companies demand higher roy-
alty rates for larger patent portfolios,166 but also demonstrated
that the value of each individual SEP declines as the portfolio
159. See Peter Quies, Valuing Standard Essential Patents: An Examination
of Announced FRAND Royalty Rates for LTE 1 (Dec. 2012),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/litigation_committ
ees/intellectual/012413-valuing-standard-essential-patents-
memo.authcheckdam.pdf.
160. Stasik, supra note 30, at 114.
161. Id. at 114.
162. Id. at 115.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 114.
165. Quies, supra note 159.
166. At one end, Qualcomm, which holds three hundred fifty essential LTE
patents, announced a royalty rate of 3.3 percent, while at the other end, Al-
catel, which holds nine essential patents, announced a royalty rate of 2.0 per-
cent. Id. at 2.
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gets larger.167 Companies with few SEPs announced a much
higher royalty per SEP than those with many.168 In essence,
“the value of one standard essential patent . . . may . . . de-
pend[] on the relative size of the patent portfolio.”169 Parties
that are aware of this phenomenon, and of the more favorable
rates that parties get in cross-licensing scenarios, can go out
and purchase some SEPs if they do not want to invest in re-
search and design themselves.170 For a company that owns a lot
of SEPs, such as Ericsson (who holds 838 essential patents on
the GSM standard), selling some patents could be far more lu-
crative than the additional royalty revenue that would be gen-
erated by licensing them with the rest of their SEPs.171
III. PATENT VALUATION OUTSIDE OF THE COURTROOM
This Part will discuss patent valuation and its pertinence to
SSOs. Many factors can affect a patent’s value, especially the
context of the valuation, so different methods may be employed
that suit specific situations. Due to the complexity of patents,
these techniques are not perfect, but are potentially useful for
comparing similar patents. Some are especially relevant for the
purpose of comparing patents that contribute to the same tech-
nical standard.
A. Patent Valuation Considerations
Valuing patents, in general, is a practice that “requires sub-
stantial technical knowledge and legal expertise.”172 The “spe-
cific context of the valuation, in terms of focus, time, purposes,
and interested parties” is important because value can be as-
sessed for legal, economic, strategic, and other reasons.173 Addi-
tionally, there is value both in the patent itself and in the un-
167. Id. at 3.
168. See id. at 2.
169. Id. at 5.
170. Stasik, supra note 30, at 118.
171. Id. at 119.
172. Michael S. Kramer, Valuation and Assessment of Patents and Patent
Portfolios Through Analytical Techniques, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP.
L. 463, 466 (2007).
173. Federico Munari & Raffaele Oriani, Why, When and How to Value Pa-
tents? An Introduction, in THE ECONOMIC VALUATION OF PATENTS : METHODS
AND APPLICATIONS 6 (Federico Munari & Raffaele Oriani eds., 2011).
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derlying technology.174 The patent itself has value as a protec-
tion right; in other words, the right to exclude others from
practicing the technology or method.175 In a patent-licensing
context, since “the licensing contract transfers not only the pa-
tent, but also the underlying technology,” it is a common prac-
tice to include the technological value with the patent.176
Further considerations affecting patent value in a licensing
situation are the time frame, the reasons underlying the need
for a license, and the nature of the parties involved in the nego-
tiation.177 A patent in the United States expires twenty years
from the filing date of the patent application, and a patent ap-
proaching the end of its life is intrinsically less valuable than
one that was just issued.178 The time frame also contributes to
varying levels of uncertainty.179 If a patent application is un-
dergoing examination there is uncertainty as to whether the
examiner will limit the scope of the claims or reject the applica-
tion altogether.180 If an issued patent has not yet been chal-
lenged by any third party there will be uncertainty regarding
the strength of the claims or whether the patent’s legitimacy
will be called into question at some point.181 This ambiguity is
reduced if a patent has undergone one or more reexaminations
and not been declared invalid.
B. Patent Valuation Considerations in the Context of SSOs
Patent value as a whole is highly subjective.182 As stated pre-
viously, a patent may be more valuable to a party when it is
kept secret, despite the royalties that could be generated.183
There are legitimate business concerns to keep in mind, such
as a potential future need to use IPR defensively,184 and
whether a company wants to “reveal[] valuable information to
174. Id. at 7.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 8–9.
178. Id. at 8.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. See id. at 13–14.
182. See Anne Layne-Farrer et al., Pricing Patents for Licensing in Stand-
ard Setting Organizations: Making Sense of FRAND Commitments 6 (CEMFI,
Working Paper No. 0702, Jan. 2007).
183. See id. at 7.
184. See Dolmans & Ilan, supra note 92, at 8.
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rivals about future technology strategies.”185 ETSI recognizes
these concerns, and “simply request[s] that members use ‘rea-
sonable endeavors’ to identify relevant intellectual property,
rather than demand an exhaustive reporting.”186
Some argue that a basic numeric proportionality method
should be used, where all patents that are essential to a stand-
ard are afforded equal value.187 Proponents justify this deter-
mination because each essential patent “afford[s] patent hold-
ers the same market power (or hold up power) ex post,” in the
sense that a manufacturer employing standardized technology
needs a license for every SEP to avoid infringing.188 The most
obvious benefit of such an arrangement would be low transac-
tion costs.189 The primary disadvantage of this method would
be a pervasive specter of unfairness. As discussed earlier, many
of the declared patents have questionable essentiality, and “[a]
rule compensating companies holding patents of questionable
relevance, but which are nonetheless declared essential, on the
same terms as those companies holding truly essential patents
would not satisfy either the ‘fair’ or the ‘reasonable’ aspects of
FRAND.”190 It would incentivize companies to declare as many
patents as possible, or even to split their innovations into mul-
tiple patents when in reality they belong within different
claims of one patent.191 Therefore, for this rule to work, a pre-
cise definition of essentiality would have to be agreed upon and
an independent reviewer would need to be employed to analyze
which patents satisfy the definition.192 Although this approach-
es a level of fairness, essentiality to a standard is only one of
many factors that influence patent value.
C. Existing Methods for Assessing Patent Value
There are a variety of methods available to assess patent
value, both quantitative (often an economic estimate in mone-
tary terms, or some other numerical value) and qualitative (a
detailed guide to a patent’s strengths and weaknesses, or a rat-
185. Layne-Farrer et al., supra note 182, at 7.
186. Id. at 7.
187. Id. at 11–14.
188. See id. at 11.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 12.
191. Id. at 12–13.
192. Id. at 12.
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ing/ranking method of different patent qualities).193 There are
qualities of both categories that could be pertinent to the valu-
ation of a FRAND-encumbered patent.
The quantitative “patent indicators approach” takes into ac-
count patent qualities such as legal status, technological scope,
citations in later patents, and existence of opposition or litiga-
tion.194 It is a quick, but imprecise method that can be per-
formed for any patent without the need for confidential infor-
mation.195 The “cost approach” quantifies “the costs of obtaining
a patented invention by either internal development or exter-
nal acquisition,” the “market approach” analyzes the pricing of
comparable patents, and the “income approach” estimates the
future cash flows associated with a patent.196 The market ap-
proach would have little bearing on standards that are still in
development, considering the cutting edge technology that is
often involved and the lack of comparable patents,197 and the
income approach would also be difficult to use, considering that
all of the essential patents are being pooled into one technolo-
gy. The patent indicators and cost approaches, however, utilize
information that is readily available while a standard is still in
development, and prior to commercial use and the licensing ne-
gotiations that follow.
The two primary qualitative methods for patent valuation are
a “due diligence approach” and the “rating/ranking ap-
proach.”198 The due diligence approach is generally “a deep in-
vestigation into the status and strength of a patent (or patent
portfolio) . . . aimed at finding relevant facts that influence the
value of the assets . . . .”199 Some elements that are considered
include “the maturity of the technology, . . . the status of the
patent procedures, potential third parties’ rights, . . . barriers
of penetration of the technology into the market, . . . and the
existence of active or passive infringements.”200 The rat-
193. Munari & Oriani, supra note 173, at 9–10.
194. Id. at 13–14.
195. Id. at 14.
196. Id. at 14–15.
197. Another reason that the market approach will not work for SEPs is the
fact that the individual SEPs may have little to no value outside of the
standardized technology.
198. Id. at 10.
199. Id. at 10.
200. Id. at 10–11.
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ing/rankings method is a relatively simple one that “assign[s]
single patents . . . to different value classes (such as ‘very im-
portant’, ‘important’, ‘less important’ or ‘negligible’)” by analyz-
ing relevant criteria and assigning a score on a scale of, for in-
stance, 1–5.201 This method allows the analyst “to obtain a
whole picture of the patent” on a broader basis than advanced
numerical techniques.202
D. Complications with Patent Valuation Techniques
There are several issues that complicate the valuation of pa-
tents, flowing from their intangible nature and their many in-
herent uncertainties.203 Unlike tangible assets, patents “can be
deployed simultaneously in different places and by different
subjects,”204 and in each instance may have context-specific
value. Additionally, their market value is difficult to ascertain
because there is not much of an established market for pa-
tents.205 In recent years companies have begun to use patents
for strategic reasons,206 encouraging greater commodification of
patents in general, but “the creation of organized and standard-
ized markets is still in its infancy.”207 The primary uncertainty
present in patents is their legal status. Not only are the bound-
aries of the property rights “fuzzy and unpredictable, due to
sometimes vague and (often strategically) ambiguous wording
of claims,” but also their validity is rarely guaranteed except
after multiple costly reexamination procedures.208 Another un-
certainty is the “future economic value that can be extracted
from patents,” stemming from the unknown future demand for
products based on the patent-protected technology and the un-
certain performance of the innovation in a commercial con-
text.209
201. Id. at 11.
202. Id. at 13.
203. Id. at 19.
204. Id. at 19–20.
205. Id. at 21.
206. Id. at 4. Reasons include the desire to “generat[e] revenue through li-
censing, increas[e] bargaining power in negotiations . . . , enhanc[e] reputa-
tion and access[] external sources of financing.” Id. at 4–5.
207. Id. at 20.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 21.
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IV. OBJECTIVE VALUATION OF PATENTS TOHELP PREEMPT AND
RESOLVEDISPUTES
FRAND must be applicable to countless different circum-
stances, thus it must remain loosely defined. There are many
factors to take into account during a contract negotiation, espe-
cially when it concerns a burgeoning technology with unpre-
dictable market value. However, a factor that should not be de-
batable is the importance of an individual SEP relative to its
standard. For example, one patent that is declared essential
may have been crucial to the implementation of the standard-
ized technology, while another patent that is declared essential
may not even read on the standard, or could be easily designed
around. These two patents should not be treated equally. If
basic valuation techniques were implemented by SSOs
throughout the development of technical standards, then the
current licensing landscape, revolving around market power
and patent portfolio size, could be legitimized and streamlined.
Litigation concerning FRAND licensing would be simplified
and better focused. This Part will explore an ideal mechanism
for performing this analysis, and will propose a workable
framework.
A. Arbitration of Patent Disputes in General
Arbitration of patent disputes is quicker and more efficient
than resolution through the court system.210 Judges are not
normally technical experts; simply getting the judge up to
speed is a lengthy undertaking, and even with proper briefing,
“patent litigation can present issues so complex that legal
minds, without appropriate grounding in science and technolo-
gy, may have difficulty in reaching a decision.”211 This difficulty
naturally leads to more hearings, expert testimony, amicus
briefs, and even demonstrations of the technology.212 In addi-
tion to the concerns with expense, the amount of time taken
“could be devastating to the parties involved.”213 Patent dis-
putes often involve a product that is currently or soon to be
manufactured. By stalling this production both parties lose po-
210. See Kilb, supra note 123, at 609.
211. Id. at 609.
212. See, e.g., id. at 610.
213. Id. at 611.
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tential revenue,214 and by the time the dispute is resolved the
patent at issue could be outdated and of little value.215 Not only
do the parties lose out, but a lengthy dispute could disad-
vantage the public as well.216 For example, in the case of a
pharmaceutical-patent conflict, the time and money spent on
litigation could have been used on research and production of a
drug treatment that saves lives.217
Detractors of arbitration cite concerns such as arbitrator bias
and the lack of procedural safeguards present in litigation.218
Bias is an ever present concern in most kinds of legal dispute
resolution, but there are safeguards in place to ensure the im-
partiality of arbitrators. They have a duty to disclose any ap-
pearance of bias,219 and courts are well equipped to assess the
impartiality of an arbitrator if a party chooses to contest it.220
Some parties may be hesitant to disclose company secrets to
outsiders, and other procedural safeguards of the judicial sys-
tem include an appeals process and extensive discovery.221 In
the context of this Note, where a form of arbitration is proposed
as a solution for assessing patent value only, these concerns
are mitigated or nonexistent. Confidentiality can be protected
by nondisclosure agreements, and the evaluation process will
be ongoing during standard development, ensuring that every
interested party will be given a chance to have its say.
B. How Arbitration Techniques Can be Used In-House at ETSI
A large amount of confusion surrounding SEPs includes a
question of whether a licensing offer is FRAND or not.222 If par-
ties can agree to the value of a patent prior to the start of li-
censing discussions, then a large hurdle is already overcome,
and much litigation may be avoided. ETSI itself should form a
new committee, comparable to one of its Technical Committees
or Specialist Task Forces,223 which will henceforth be called the
214. See id. at 611.
215. See id. at 610.
216. Id. at 611.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 623.
219. Id. at 618.
220. See generally id. at 618–23.
221. Id. at 624.
222. SeeMueller, supra note 121.
223. See How We Organize Our Work, supra note 52.
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“Valuation Committee,” to determine the value of patents de-
clared to a standard, using elements of the valuation tech-
niques previously discussed. Each of the valuation methods
will be analyzed for application in this unique standard-setting
context, and the optimal result will be an amalgamation of dif-
ferent parts of the techniques. There are some obvious concerns
with this proposal, not least of which being the reliability of the
patent-value assessment, but those concerns will be addressed
below. Implicit in this impartial valuation is an assessment of
whether or not the patent that has been declared essential is
actually essential. True value aside, overcoming the initial
hurdle of essentiality will help legitimize the standard-setting
process and could reduce disputes regarding patent validity.
Although ETSI is the focus, similar methods may be appropri-
ate for other SSOs.
The assessment should be performed by ETSI itself, or an-
other similarly situated SSO, rather than hiring an external
firm. ETSI is in the best position to perform this assessment;
although it generally does not analyze the patents that are dis-
closed to it, it has the greatest capability to do so, and attach-
ing its name to the appraisal will enhance the legitimacy of the
judgment.224 ETSI had an income of approximately $25 million
in 2013, with contributions coming from members and various
commercial activities.225 The potential cost of the Valuation
Committee requires an analysis outside the scope of this paper,
but patent arbitration in general costs far less than a patent
infringement case.226 One policy that ETSI could implement is
to charge a fee for every patent that is declared essential, with
the money going directly toward the valuation. If a company is
able to avoid even one patent suit because of the program, then
it will almost certainly be saving money in the long term. Addi-
tionally, ownership of an essential patent comes with an array
224. Lemley, supra note 8, at 1966.
225. ETSI, ANNUAL REPORT (2014),
http://www.etsi.org/images/files/AnnualReports/etsi-annual-report-april-
2014.pdf.
226. In America, litigating a patent infringement case can take three to five
years and cost $3–5 million. Todd Hixon, For Most Small Companies Patents
Are Just About Worthless, FORBES (Oct. 4, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/toddhixon/2013/10/04/for-most-small-companies-
patents-are-just-about-worthless/; see also Kilb, supra note 123, at 609.
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of benefits, as discussed earlier, and it is not unrealistic for an
SSO to demand a fee from its members.
Although standardization is an ongoing process taking many
years, it would not be desirable for one comprehensive SEP
valuation to be done at the very end of the standardization pro-
cess. Standardized technology is often rolled out before all of
the relevant patents are declared or even applied for, and con-
tract negotiations may be initiated before the technology is per-
fected and implemented.227 Therefore, there is a need for con-
tinuous evaluation throughout the process as new patents are
being declared, to take place at some interval of weeks or
months, or once certain numbers of SEP declarations are
reached. This does not, however, mean that a full analysis is
required at every interval. If the Valuation Committee is work-
ing within a ranking framework such as 1–10, where one is
minimal relative value and ten is maximum relative value,
then it would not be very difficult for it to change an initial de-
termination of value by bumping it up or down when new in-
formation comes in. The valuation will need to be fairly basic;
an extensive analysis would neither be desired by the parties,
nor useful during such a preliminary stage.
C. How the Valuation Would Work
The patent-valuation methods discussed previously provide a
useful starting point for figuring out a workable framework.228
A comprehensive quantitative analysis, where a patent is as-
signed an economic estimate of its worth,229 is not entirely nec-
essary in the context of an SSO. It would be useful, but prohibi-
tively costly, to do such an analysis for the hundreds or thou-
sands of patents that are declared to a standard. However, the
factors that a quantitative analysis generally takes into ac-
count could be useful.230 The patent indicators method, for ex-
ample, takes into account the legal status of the pa-
227. See Quies, supra note 159, at 1 (“Starting in late 2008, a number of
companies announced royalty rates they would charge for handsets using the
LTE standard . . . .”). This was so even though there were new declarations
for LTE as recent as September 26, 2014. See IPR Online Database, ETSI,
http://ipr.etsi.org/ (last visited Jan. 24, 2015).
228. SeeMunari & Oriani, supra note 173.
229. See id. at 13.
230. See id.
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tent/application, which is very relevant.231 A granted patent
generally has greater value than when it is in its application
phase because of the uncertainty regarding whether it will ever
issue as a patent.232 It would be unrealistic to expect the Valua-
tion Committee to delve deeply into the validity of a patent ap-
plication; that is a job for a professional patent examiner, and
is time consuming and costly.233 However, a simple considera-
tion of its legal status is worthwhile. Other patent qualities
that the patent indicators method utilizes234 are also worth
considering. The cost approach is similarly relevant.235 If, for
example, a company invested significant time and money into a
burgeoning technology, that investment may be taken into ac-
count.236 This factor could be important when a particularly
difficult engineering problem has been solved. It may be diffi-
cult to assess this factor with any sort of accuracy,237 but if this
situation arises the committee can choose to disregard it. It is
not the goal of the Valuation Committee to determine an exact
value, but to consider many factors and arrive at an estimate.
The market approach and the income approach, however,
would have little bearing on this assessment.238 During the
standardization process, it is generally assumed that there are
not any similar patents or technology out there to compare
with. Analyzing the income that can be generated from a SEP
is similarly irrelevant, because the patent may have little value
standing alone, and is only profitable when combined with the
rest of the SEPs.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 8.
233. The cost varies, but in 2011 an inter partes examination was estimated
to cost $278,000 from start to finish. Scott A. McKeown, How Much Does Pa-
tent Reexamination Cost?, PATENTS POST-GRANT (Aug. 25, 2011),
http://www.patentspostgrant.com/lang/en/2011/08/how-much-does-patent-
reexamination-cost. Also, an evaluation of prior art or obviousness is not rel-
evant to the proposed evaluation. It is the worth of the technology in relation
to other contributing technology, and the technology as a whole, that is the
focus.
234. These qualities include technological scope, citations in later patents,
and existence of opposition or litigation. See Munari & Oriani, supra note
173, at 13.
235. See id. at 14.
236. Id. at 14.
237. Companies would be incentivized to inflate their research and design
numbers in order to effect greater importance for their patents.
238. Munari & Oriani, supra note 173, at 14–15.
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The qualitative approaches are applicable in the SEP context
as well. The due diligence approach239 would be very useful, but
may be difficult when a technology is still in development.
Delving deeply into the strength of a patent may be impossible
at this early stage because it is unknown what the final techno-
logical product is going to look like. It might also be prohibi-
tively expensive. The rating/ranking approach,240 however,
seems ideal. The quantitative techniques may be too expensive
for SSOs, but taking similar factors into account, such as in-
vestment, technological scope, and any prior opposition, and
assigning a broad 1–5 or 1–10 ranking241 to every patent in
each of those categories, is cheap and effective. An obvious cri-
tique to this method is all of the rounding and guesswork that
seems implicit in it, but that does not mean there is no utility
in it.
A common theme in current FRAND litigation is inflated
claims for damages and desired royalty rates.242 Judge
Holderman in In re Innovatio IP Ventures reduced IP Ventures’
award to a few percentage points of its original claim.243 He
justified this action by stressing the importance of the patent to
the standard at issue and ruled that patents of lesser im-
portance are not entitled to as high of rates as patents of great-
er importance.244 This proposed valuation framework intends to
assess that very same importance, ex ante and prior to any ne-
gotiations or litigation. The intent is for contracting parties to
have an initial understanding of the patent value prior to nego-
tiations. In the same way that Judge Holderman’s judgment
turned on the classification of the at-issue patents as “of mod-
erate to moderate-high importance to the standard,”245 an opin-
ion from ETSI that assesses this same importance would give
negotiating parties a relatively clear picture of the importance
of their patents.
239. See id. at 10.
240. See id. at 11.
241. Id.
242. See, e.g., In re Innovatio IP Ventures, LLC Patent Litigation, No. 11 C
9308, 2013 WL 5593609 (N.D. Ill 2013).
243. Id. at *44; Lewis, supra note 137.
244. In re Innovatio, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609, at *44.
245. Id.
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D. The Effects of Such Valuation
The intended effect of this mandatory patent valuation is not
to solve every patent-licensing disagreement that parties will
have. It is merely a proposed tool that will help companies
come to an agreement more efficiently. Both parties will be
aware if one party has a portfolio full of patents with little im-
portance and will not waste time debating the value. Similarly,
if two parties are in litigation regarding whether or not a royal-
ty rate is FRAND, the judge will not have to perform an inde-
pendent analysis of the patent’s importance herself, but can
instead rely on ETSI’s determination. The effect of this reli-
ance, and the initial determination of essentiality, will be far
reaching. Duplicitous patent holders that may claim essentiali-
ty for meritless patents will now be barred from asserting SEP
rights.246 Important innovators with valuable patents will be
more justly rewarded for their innovation, not only by having
an “important” label on their SEPs, but by no longer competing
for royalties with patents that are deemed to be nonessential.
An objective patent valuation would also have significant im-
plications for a smaller company that might have formerly ac-
cepted a low royalty rate for important SEP contributions. If
this weaker entity has an ETSI valuation to fall back on, it
might be more willing to engage in limited litigation against a
more powerful adversary. When the likelihood of success is
greater there is less risk of wasteful litigation. This is not to
say, however, that an ETSI valuation would be material in all
or even most SEP-related disputes; this valuation cannot in-
clude an assessment of a patent’s validity, not only because it
would be expensive, but because an ETSI validity ruling would
hold little to no weight with any jurisdiction worldwide.
E. Potential Pitfalls and Solutions
One of the most important issues that this method would en-
counter is getting SSO members to agree to it.247 The compa-
nies that currently use their dominant market power to get fa-
vorable royalty rates would have no incentive to support this
initiative. Considering their size and power, their opinion could
have a significant influence on the rest of the industry. Howev-
er, the nonbinding nature of this valuation could make it more
246. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1966.
247. See id. at 1967.
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attractive. The judgments of the Valuation Committee would
not be binding on any court or legally affect any party, unless
courts chose to utilize them. If the committee does its job well
enough, eventually it will gain enough legitimacy to directly
influence the licensing strategies of SSO members. Implicit in
this effect is the good faith of the negotiating parties. Parties
would be able to handily oppose this initiative if they would
rather fight tooth and nail for every last cent of royalty reve-
nue.
Another related issue is the amount of deference a judicial
body would give a valuation ruling. This valuation cannot en-
compass everything that a court would consider in an in-
fringement or reasonable royalty-setting case. For instance, an
“important” ruling by the Valuation Committee would mean
very little if the patent is later found to be invalid. For courts to
give this valuation any sort of respect would take time. If after
the committee is implemented courts continue to make rulings
similar to Judge Holderman in In re Innovatio IP Ventures,
who analyzed the importance of the patent to the standard,248
then there will be data available comparing committee rulings
to court-ordered rulings. If the judgments from the two bodies
sync up to a reasonable degree, then courts would feel more
comfortable slowly introducing these valuation rulings into
their opinions. At a minimum, ETSI will have an essentiality
assessment that will keep the SSO-patent pool free from du-
plicitous declarations.249
CONCLUSION
The legal issues underlying the smartphone wars have no
simple solution. So long as there are advantages for companies
to exploit, there will be no objective fairness to the SSO patent-
licensing system. What this Note proposes is not an overhaul of
this flawed system, but rather a small step towards the fair
compensation of patent holders. The hands-off approach that
ETSI currently employs allows dominant parties too much flex-
ibility to bully their adversaries into granting or accepting roy-
alties to their disadvantage. This approach hurts the legitima-
cy of the organization and causes rampant uncertainty in the
technological community. A basic patent valuation prior to li-
248. In re Innovatio, No. 11 C 9308, 2013 WL 5593609.
249. See Lemley, supra note 8, at 1967.
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censing negotiations will give weaker parties a clearer idea of
the worth of their IPR. The basic patent valuation techniques
that are currently used can be easily tailored to the standard-
setting context, and some of the mystery surrounding FRAND
licensing can be eliminated. FRAND is simply not enough
guidance, and so long as administrative bodies continue to shy
away from a clearer definition, costly litigation is the only an-
swer.
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